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CONTROLLING
THE ENGLISH PROSECUTOR
By DOUGLAS HAY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In two 1971 appeals, both the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court of Canada affirmed a High Court ruling upholding the AttorneyGeneral's discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions as he saw fit, particularly
with respect to the decision to prosecute and the mode of proceeding.I In the
course of its judgment, the High Court had recapitulated the English history
of the Attorney-General's exclusive rights to issue a fiat for a writ of error, to
exhibit an ex officio criminal information, to enter a nolle prosequi or stay of
proceedings, and to act in relator actions. 2 Not confining itself to the delineation of these powers, however, the Court expressed some general propositions
about the right to prosecute:
there has existed in the United Kingdom, and thus in Canada, a constitutional
discretion in the Attorney-General, which discretion is exercised on behalf of the
Crown, to deal with the institution and control of prosecutions. It therefore
follows that the right of the individual to equality before the law... is modified by
the exclusive constitutional right of the Attorney-General, as the chief law officer
of the Crown, to deal with the prosecution of the offences under our law. [Emphasis added.] 3
This says, or appears to say, too much. If "exclusive" means that particular powers of the Attorney-General-are not subject to judicial supervision,
and that the Attorney-General is answerable for them only to Parliament, it is
an unexceptional statement of the law. But it would be a mistake to take this to
mean that in England only the Attorney-General or his agents could
prosecute, 4 although such an interpretation would be consistent with an at© Copyright, 1983, Douglas Hay.
* Associate Professor, Law and History, Osgoode Hall Law School and York University. A version of this paper was presented at the Annual Lecture Series, Osgoode Hall
Law School, December 2, 1981. The historical research on which it is based was
generously supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
(Canada) and the Social Science Research Council (United Kingdom). Those findings
will be published at length elsewhere, with full references. I am grateful to Professors
J.M. Beattie, B.M. Dickens and J.LI.J. Edwards (Toronto), Reuben Hasson (Osgoode)
and John Smith (Nottingham) for reading another version of this paper.
IR. v. Smythe, [1971] 2 O.R. 209, 17 D.L.R. (3d) 389, 3 C.C.C. (2d) 97, aff'd
(1971), 3 C.C.C. (2d) 366 (S.C.C.).
2For a full account of the history and powers of the Attorney-General, cited by the
court, see Edwards, The Law Officers of the Crown (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964).
The ex officio information was abolished by the CriminalLaw Act, 1967, c. 58, s. 6 (6)
(U.K.). The fiat for the writ of error was replaced by judicial certificate in 1960: Administrationof Justice Act, 1960, 8 Eliz. 2, c. 65, s. 1 (U.K.).
3Supra note 1, at 222 (O.R.), 402 (D.L.R.), 109-10 (C.C.C.).
4A misreading might be fostered by the statement (at 219 (O.R.), 399 (D.L.R.), 107
(C.C.C.) ) that "it was the King's constitutional right to prosecute all [emphasis added]
crimes, and it was on his behalf that the Attorney-General instituted the prosecutions."
The reference here is to a paragraph in Wilkes v. The King (1768), Wilm. 322, 97 E.R.
123, which in fact established only that an ex officio information could be exhibited by
servants of the King other than the Attorney-General. In any case, it said nothing about
any other criminal prosecutions, that is, the vast majority. See text accompanying note
15, infra.
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titude to prosecutorial powers that can be found in other Canadian cases,
which have held that "the State alone can prosecute," that the AttorneyGeneral is the proper representative of the State, and that when a private individual attempts to prosecute any but minor offences, law or policy or both
suggest that he or she should not be encouraged to do so.5 English as well as
Canadian authorities have been cited in support.
What follows is not a discussion of the present law of Canada. It is a brief
sketch of the origins of a different attitude, in England, to the wider implications of private prosecutions. Much of the emphasis in Canadian cases and
comments is on the malignant dangers lurking in private use of the law. Farris
C.J. in a decision on an appeal before the British Columbia Supreme Court,
said in 1946:
For individuals who are thinking only of themselves and not of society as a whole
to have the right to institute and carry on criminal proceedings would
6 destroy the
whole fabric of the recognised fairness of our criminal prosecutions.
Another statement, often quoted, is that of Miller J. of Manitoba in 1964:
[Greater rights to private prosecutors would] unnecessarily widen the field of prosecution of Her Majesty's subjects to any obsessed, vindictive, unscrupulous, selfstyled saviour.
7 Her Majesty's subjects are entitled to freedom from unwarranted
prosecution.
And in 1976, Gushue J. of Newfoundland on an appeal from a conviction obtained by a private prosecutor without the knowledge or concurrence of the
Attorney-General, declared that without such concurrence the result of private
prosecutions "could very well be anarchy." 8 These and other judgments emphasize the beneficent effects of the Crown's quasi-judicial role in protecting
the rights of the accused, notably as a shield to unjust and malicious accusations. 9 Almost entirely absent is consideration of two facts of striking
significance to an historian of English criminal law: that private prosecution
was carefully protected until the recent past, and that it was thought an important constitutional guarantee of civil liberty. 10
5

R. v. Gilmore (1903), 6 O.L.R. 286, 7 C.C.C. 219 (H.C.); Woo Tuck v. Scallen
(1928), 46 Que. K.B. 437 at 441, 51 C.C.C. 365 at 368; R. v. Whiteford, [19471 1
W.W.R. 903 at 907, 89 C.C.C. 74 at 77-78 (B.C.S.C.); Campbellv. Sumida (1964), 49
D.L.R. (2d) 263 at 270-71, 50 W.W.R. 16 at 25, [1965] 3 C.C.C. 29 at 38-39 (Man.
C.A.); Mandelbaum v. Denstedt (1968), 66 W.W.R. 636 at 640, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 119 at
128 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Dalton (1976), 22 A.P.R. 287 at 290, 292-93, 294, 11 N. &
P.E.I.R. 287 at 290, 292-93, 294 (Nfld. C.A.). Supra note 1, at 370-71.
6 Whiteford, supra note 5, at 906 (W.W.R.), 76 (C.C.C.).
7
Campbell, supra note 5, at 271 (D.L.R.), 25 (W.W.R.), 39 (C.C.C.).
8
Dalton, supra note 5, at 294 (A.P.R.), 294 (N. & P.E.I.R.).
9
Campbell, supra note 5, at 271 (D.L.R.), 25 (W.W.R.), 39 (C.C.C.);
Mandelbaum, supra note 5, at 638 (W.W.R.), 126 (C.C.C.); and Dalton, supra note 5,
at 293-94 (A.P.R.), 293-94 (N. & P.E.I.R.).
10 The fullest account of this "basic right, derived from English Law" is that of
Wilson J. in R. v. Schwerdt (1957), 23 W.W.R. 374, 119 C.C.C. 81 (B.C.S.C.), in
which the possibility that an Attorney-General might refuse to prosecute where he
should do so is considered at 385 (W.W.R.), 91 (C.C.C.); that possibility is also mentioned in R. v. Weiss (1915), 8 Sask. L.R. 74 at 76, 23 D.L.R. 710 at 712, 23 C.C.C. 460
at 463 (S.C.C.). See also ReMcMicken (1912), 22 Man. R. 693 at 701-702, 8 D.L.R. 550
at 556, 20 C.C.C. 334 at 342 (C.A.); and R. ex rel. McLeod v. Boulding (1920), 53
D.L.R. 657, 33 C.C.C. 227 (Sask. C.A.). The place of private prosecution in Canadian
law has arisen recently in two cases, decided in the Ontario Court of Appeal, for which
leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Canada on 17 December, 1981 (Re
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In the words of Sir James Stephen, writing in 1883, private prosecutions
"both in our own days and in earlier times, have given a legal vent to feelings
in every way entitled to respect, and have decided peaceably and in an authentic manner many questions of great constitutional importance." 11 Many other
commentators in the nineteenth century were more emphatic: they argued that
the engrossing of all criminal prosecutions into the hands of the law officers of
the Crown, or the police, was to be resisted vigorously. The constitutional
history of England suggested to them that, far from being the proper source of
protection for the citizen against unjust charges, the executive could well be
the most dangerous of oppressors. One of the crucial safeguards of the
citizenry against an executive contemptuous of liberty was the right of private
prosecution. In the twentieth century that tradition has not been so strongly
expressed, but there are signs that it may be reviving. 12 A review of its history
suggests that Canadians should be more attentive to it also.
II.

THE ENGLISH PRIVATE PROSECUTOR

It invites confusion to suggest that the English Attorney-General since the
mid-eighteenth century has held a virtual monopoly "to deal with the prosecution of the offences under our law."' 13 Nor is it very helpful to look at the
treatises for the evidence: the right of any private citizen to initiate and conduct a prosecution through to conviction, whether he was the victim or not,
was so constantly exercised in the eighteenth century that it needed no comment. It was in fact the paradigm of prosecution. More than eighty percent of
indictable offences (all of them tried by judge and jury, and constituting about
one half of all criminal cases) were prosecuted by the victim of the crime or his
agent. 14 Most of the remaining offences were prosecuted by ordinary citizens
who happened to occupy the rotating office of parish constable at the time and
who had been bound over by magistrates to prosecute because the victim of the
crime was too poor or otherwise incapable. A handful of cases were prosecuted by the Treasury Solicitor, acting for the government in coining cases
and thus in some sense as a state prosecutor.
Finally, a very small number of cases, fewer than one percent of the total,
were prosecuted at the direction of the Attorney-General or his agents. Almost
all of these were state trials, usually for treason or seditious libel. The latter,
Dowson and The Queen (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 286, 24 C.R. (3d) 139; Re Inderpaul
Candhoke, ex p. Howard Buchbinder (unreported), decided at the same time for the
same reasons). These judgments turned on the question of the point at which the
Attorney-General's power to direct a stay may be exercised, but implicitly raise many of
the policy issues discussed in this article. See Kopyto, Dowson/BuchbinderCase Comment (1982), 25 Crim. L.Q. 66, published after the lecture on which the present article
was based, for a discussion of some of the legal and policy issues. Kopyto's Comment is
unfortunately marred by serious errors in the brief and undocumented historical account he gives at 90-92.
1 A History of the CriminalLaw in England (London: Macmillan, 1883) vol. Iat
496. On the meaning of the term "private prosecution", see infra note 35.
12lnfra note 68.
13Smythe, supra note 3.
14The numbers given here and below are those for Staffordshire in the second half
of the eighteenth century; it is likely that they are comparable to those for other counties. See Hay, War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: the Record of the
English Courts (1982), 95 Past and Present 124 at 151. For the nineteenth century cf.
Philips, Crime and Authority in Victorian England (London: Croom Helm, 1977) at
123ff.
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which were more numerous, were usually prosecuted in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries by the Attorney-General, exercising his unique privilege
of prosecuting grave misdemeanours by an ex officio information in King's
Bench. This procedure eliminated the grand jury, could allow the careful packing of a special jury, and saddled the defendant with heavy costs even if the
Crown lost. The information was therefore often attacked as the monstrous
offspring of Star Chamber, an anomaly of which the constitution should be
purged. The courts upheld ex officio informations, but they fell into disuse in
the latter part of the nineteenth century because of their connotations of
political oppression. They were always few in number. 15
Thus the typical prosecution in England was on indictment at the initiative of a private citizen who was the victim of a crime and who conducted
the prosecution in almost all cases. Blackstone's only mention of this most obvious fact of eighteenth-century English criminal law was the remark that "indictments ...are preferred... in the name of the King, but at the suit of any
private prosecutor .... ,,16 Chitty began his account of the criminal law with
the observation that "as offenses, for the most part, more immediately 17affect
a particular individual, it is not usual for any other person to interfere."
When he went to law (ninety-four percent of prosecutors were men' 8), the
private individual enjoyed discretion at many crucial points. He could often
choose the charge on the indictment, either because the recognizance binding
him to prosecute did not specify the offence exactly, or because the court did
not inquire provided some indictment was preferred, or because he exercised
the prerogative of any citizen to charge any other with any offence before the
grand jury. Even the indictment, the only formal written record of the charge,
could be drawn by his own lawyer on his instructions, rather than by the Clerk
of the Court. The effective result was often that the prosecutor could choose
among a variety of likely penalties, or do his utmost to ensure that technical
drafting problems (a frequent cause of failed prosecutions) were dealt with by
his own solicitors. Thus Matthew Boulton, head of the famous engineering
firm of Boulton and Watt, was well pleased with the craftsmanship of his
lawyers in a difficult burglary prosecution in 1801. Boulton wanted a death
sentence, and had high hopes for the trial: the indictment measured two feet by
four, contained eight counts, and, according to Boulton's son, "it appears to
be formed like a swivel gun and may be directed to all points as circumstances
require." 19
The private prosecutor also had much influence in deciding what
witnesses to take before the magistrate for the preliminary hearing (which was
15Although approximately 6,000 indictments were laid at Quarter Sessions and
Assizes in Staffordshire, the Attorney-General exhibited fewer than twenty ex officio
informations against defendants in the county between 1742 and 1802. About twice that
many criminal informations were exhibited by private prosecutors through the Master
of the Crown Office (author's unpublished findings).
164 Commentaries 303.
17A PracticalTreatise on the CriminalLaw (1816) vol. I at 1.
I8 Supra note 14.
19Letter (March 8, 1801), Birmingham Reference Library, Boulton and Watt MSS,
ParcelB; Public Record Office, Assi 5/121 Staffs. Lent 1801. The case is discussed in
Hay, Manufacturersand the CriminalLaw in the LaterEighteenth Century: Crime and
'Police' in South Staffordshire (1983), Past &Present Colloquium, Police and Policing.
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not a necessary step), and before the grand jury (which was necessary for the
finding of any indictment). The fact that a preliminary hearing was optional,
but that it was always followed by a grand jury hearing, increased the discretionary powers of the prosecutor. If he decided to avoid the preliminary hearing and go directly to the grand jury with what came to be called a "voluntary
bill", on which only his own witnesses were heard, he could seek an indictment
for any offence and construct a case without the accused even being aware that
proceedings had begun. 20 If he chose to go before a magistrate first, his
evidence was sometimes heard exparte, and it was said in both the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries that lay magistrates were loath to dismiss charges, apparently believing that that was the proper role of the grand jury, and perhaps
influenced by clerks with a pecuniary interest in prosecutions.
If, for whatever reasons, the prosecutor decided to drop the charge, he
could do so without resulting official inquiry. In the case of a voluntary bill,
this could be done at will and without penalty, as there had been no
recognizances. On the other hand, a prosecutor bound over in preliminary
hearings could drop the charge by forfeiting the recognizance or, with a little
care, perhaps at no cost at all. A new witness with contradictory testimony, or
hesitation and a contrived appearance of insincerity on the part of the prosecutor, might convince the grand jurors (who had no depositions from the
preliminary hearing) to throw out the charge. 2 1In the early nineteenth century,
critics argued that both the collusive dropping of charges and vexatious or
malicious prosecutions were facilitated by the nature of preliminary inquiries
and grand jury hearings. 22
The private prosecutor also strongly influenced the outcome of the trial
through the fact that he chose his own solicitor, who instructed counsel (if a
barrister was retained) to conduct the case in the manner most likely to yield
the outcome he wished. In these circumstances, it was not unknown for the
prosecuting lawyer to be unhappy with the result. In one case in 1787 the barrister petitioned for a pardon for a prisoner whom he had just successfully
prosecuted, declaring that he:
20 Replaced by "bill of indictment" proceedings since the abolition of the grand
jury in 1933: Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions)Act, 1933, 23 & 24
Geo. 5, c. 36, s. 2 (U.K.). Its recent use by the Crown to avoid preliminary hearings in
cases in Northern Ireland has drawn criticisms reminiscent of those directed against the
ex officio information, now defunct, in earlier centuries. See The Guardian, Oct. 6,
1982, "Crown Tries to Avoid Supergrass Hearing."
21On the other hand, to get a nolle prosequi with the consent of the prosecutor or
at his request required the fiat of the Attorney-General: R. v. Emlyn (Trinity 1820;
Chitty, A PracticalTreatise on the Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1826) vol. I at 479); R. v.
Cranner(1700), 12 Mod. 648, 88 E.R. 1578, 1 Ld. Raym. 721, 91 E.R. 1381. See also
Edwards, supra note 2, at 238.
22For evidence that such practices occurred before some magistrates and grand
juries in the 1840s, see the Appendix to the Royal Commission on CriminalLaw, Eighth
Report (c. 656, 1845). A summary of some of the testimony on these points is given in
Pue, The CriminalTwilight Zone: Pre-Trial Proceduresin the 1840's (1983), 21 Alta. L.
Rev. 335 at 338-39, 352-53 (ex parte or inadequate preliminary hearings), 347-49, 355
(perjury before grand juries), 354 (pecuniary interests of clerks and weak cases going
forward), 356 (malicious use of voluntary bill). Widely scattered evidence in other
sources supports such assertions. On the Report see also Cornish, "Defects in Prosecuting: Professional Views in 1845," in Glazebrook, ed., Reshaping Criminal Law
(London: Stevens, 1978).
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was so unfortunate as to be Counsel against the prisoner at his trial, that His prosecutors discovered the most rancorous malice and revenge upon the Occasion, and
that there were not wanting
23 circumstances on his trial which rendered him an Object of great Compassion.
Finally, after a conviction, the Government and the King would pay great attention to the wishes of the prosecutor in deciding whether or not to grant a
free or conditional pardon, particularly in cases in which the death sentence
had resulted.
Small wonder, then, given the range of prosecutorial discretion, that one
frequently finds eighteenth-century private prosecutors reflecting gravely on
their power. As one observed in 1796 in a theft case:
[I]f I succeed I shall most certainly hang the culprit. It is certainly more
honourable to detect felons than it is to committ Felonys. However I wish to hold
24
the scales of justice even and never suffer one's power to border upon Tyranny.
His words betray an acute awareness that he would be the focus of much local
attention by both the propertied and the poor. Because his discretion was so
wide, the private prosecutor's acts were constantly scrutinized and subjected to
the ethical judgments of the community, and of the different classes of which
it was composed. Because he might be made to change his course, the pressure
could be very great. When the prosecutor was determined to proceed in the
face of sharp public criticism, he would commonly defend his actions in the
press, as in this appeal published after an execution in 1802:
Edward Allen, one of the unfortunate Men who suffered on Washwood Heath on
Monday last for a Forgery on the Bank of England, having persisted in his Innocence to the last, and accused me of being his Murderer, I think it a Justice due
to myself to state to the Public, through the Medium of your Paper, the Circumstances which led to his detection and Conviction .... 25

Such a declaration might help to meet the objections of the propertied and the
literate, but prosecutors affronting popular opinion had to decide whether to
take the chance (by prosecuting rigorously, or even prosecuting at all) that
their hedges would be broken, their saplings slashed or their animals maimed.
The danger of anonymous malicious damage to property, particularly in rural
parishes, undoubtedly subjected some prosecutors to strong pressure to drop

charges, to reduce the charge between the preliminary inquiry and the grand
jury hearing, or not to begin at all. Within the community itself this greatly accentuated the pressure to reach accommodations outside the courts. In each
case, the pressure exerted on the prosecutor differed according to the norms of

the community, the personal reputations of the prosecutor and the accused,
and the degree to which the particular offence appeared to threaten others.
For much of the eighteenth century, the disadvantages that resulted - indifferent enforcement, widespread compounding of offences between thieves
and victims, fear of retaliation - were not felt to be a serious disadvantage by
the political elite that controlled Parliament. Their own property was relatively
secure; they rarely used the more severe penal laws against theft; and the
23Letter of Theophilous Swift (July 31, 1787), Public Record Office, H042/12 fol.
98.
24

Mr. Lampton to M. Boulton (June 7, 1796), Birmingham Reference Library,
Boulton
and Watt MSS, ParcelD.
25
Swinney's Birmingham Chronicle, April 22, 1802.
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discretion that private prosecution gave them to forgive the offender in the interests of noblesse oblige was very useful as a means of maintaining consent to
their oligarchic rule. 26 However, as the subsequent history of attempts to
develop a state prosecutorial function suggests, their attachment to private
prosecution probably derived above all from their abhorrence of the alternative, a state prosecution. The political elite of the eighteenth century were
bred in a constitutional tradition that celebrated the recent humbling of tyrannical kings by Parliament. Many came from families in which executive tyranny under the Commonwealth or the Stuarts had caused much personal suffering, and the memory was still sharp. Star Chamber had been abolished in 1641
and the monarchy restored and made beholden to Parliament in 1660 and
1688, and the gentlemen of England were not now going to be party to any increase in the power of the executive to set the criminal law in motion. Even the
extant powers of the Attorney-General, such as the ability to proceed by way
of ex officio informations, were the targets of strong parliamentary criticism
as a dangerous inheritance from the past. It was almost inconceivable that the
Attorney-General should act as the protector of the ordinary citizen from oppressive prosecutions. The law officers of the Crown knew nothing of the vast
majority of prosecutions and there was no administrative machinery to provide that information. The nolleprosequiwas a practical nullity in day-to-day
prosecutions. The protection of the innocent was instead confided in the main
to the grand jury, and properly so, in the view of contemporary opinion.
Grand juries did indeed throw out twenty-five percent of the bills of indictment (compared to four percent by the late nineteenth century), 27 although
what proportion of these was rejected as malicious, or vexatious, or poorly
drawn or unsupported by the evidence, one cannot say. It is clear, however,
that controlling the abuse of prosecution was, like its use in the first place,
principally in the hands of the citizenry rather than the government.
From time to time, and for particular classes of the propertied, the disadvantages of relying on the private prosecutor brought changes that nonetheless
never touched the principle. Legislation enacted in the eighteenth and,
especially, the nineteenth centuries gradually increased the costs granted to
prosecutors, in an effort to spur them on to greater action. It had some unforeseen results (discussed infra) in opening the law to more democratic uses. The
other expedient was even more typical of the period; it fact, it epitomizes all
the assumptions on which the enforcement of the law was based. It was the
private "Association for the Prosecution of Felons". There were hundreds of
such groups throughout the country - probably about a thousand by the
mid-nineteenth century. 28 Their growth is discernable from the middle of the
eighteenth century, although some appear as early as the late 1600s.
26
Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," in Hay, Linebaugh, Thompson, eds., Albion's FatalTree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England(London: 27Allen Lane, 1975).
Hay, Crime, Authority and the CriminalLaw: Staffordshire 1750-1800 (Ph.D.
thesis, Univ. of Warwick, 1975) at Table 8.3; Maitland, Justice and Police (London:
Macmillan,
1885) at 139.
28
Philips, Good Men to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire:Associationsfor the
Prosecution of Felons in England 1770-1860, paper presented at a conference on The
History of Law, Labour, and Crime, Univ. of Warwick, School of Law, Sept. 15-18,
1983.
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In a typical case the members entered into articles of association and
agreed to share costs, pool any rewards obtained on convictions, offer rewards
to witnesses, and elect a committee to decide which cases to prosecute.
Sometimes associations also organized foot and horse patrols, paid retainers
to keepers of turnpike gates to watch for stolen horses, and agreed at least to
consider undertaking cases on behalf of poorer victims of crime who could not
afford to go to law themselves. Such benevolence was not always fully appreciated; in one Birmingham case, in which the association prosecuted for a
poor woman and then kept the substantial parliamentary reward for getting a
capital conviction, "[t]he poor woman says now with tears, that the society
Robbed more than the thief did of what was her due in reason." ' 29 In most
cases, however, associations prosecuted only on behalf of their own members,
and only after a committee decision as to which offences to pursue.
These private bodies undoubtedly affected the administration of the
criminal law to a considerable extent. Although their members probably constituted fewer than ten percent of the adult male population, they accounted
for as much as a quarter or more of prosecutions. 30 Some sought even greater
influence. A few of the most active associations attempted to compel their
members to surrender the most important discretionary decision of the private
prosecutor, the right to forgive the offence entirely. One Midlands association
in the 1770s provided that if any members should "screen, forgive, or otherwise overlook any Felony or Felonies" they should pay a healthy fine. Others
promised to prosecute their members for compounding offences. Still others
provided for expulsion from the association. 31 Such terms were by no means
general, probably because insistence on them would diminish memberships in
the prosecuting associations, pafticularly from among the gentry. Prosecutorial discretion was so pervasive, so useful in negotiations between the victim of the crime and the accused, and so coloured with libertarian constitutional meaning, that even wholly voluntary bodies rarely succeeded in curtailing it in the eighteenth century.
This system persisted to some extent throughout the nineteenth century.
In particular, the right of the private prosecutor to initiate and conduct proceedings was largely untouched. The private prosecutor remained uncontrolled
except by grand and petty juries, to a lesser extent by magistrates, and by the
remote possibility of a nolleprosequi.There were changes, however. The most
significant was the creation of the new-style police forces between 1829 and
1856, beginning with the Metropolitan force in London and gradually extending to boroughs and counties by the enactment of permissive and eventually
compulsory legislation. In roughly the same period successive Acts of Parliament, most notably in 1826, provided for ever more generous costs for prosecutors. 32 A major reason for both the new police forces and the more
generous costs, and almost certainly a result of them as well, was the
phenomenal increase in indictments between 1815 and the late 1840s. At a time
29James Murray to Henry Kempson (Sept. 12, 1785), Birmingham Reference
Library, 259647.
30
An estimate based on the activity of 21 Staffordshire associations active in the
1780s: see Hay, supra note 27, at Table 7.3.
31
Aris'Birmingham Gazette, Mar. 16 & 30, 1772, Oct. 14 & 19, 1771; Birmingham
Reference Library, Caddick and Yates MSS (Feb. 1, 1773).
32 1826, 7 Geo. 4, c. 64 (U.K.). For a brief outline of the legislation see Philips,
supra note 14, at 112-13.
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when population in England increased by perhaps fifty percent, the number of
indictments for felonies and misdemeanours increased seven-fold. 33 Contemporary accounts argued that this massive increase in indicted crime represented
to some degree a real increase in crime, and it is likely, in view of widespread
destitution in this period, that they were right. One response was to increase
the granting of costs to induce more private prosecutors to come forward in
the public interest.
The creation of the police had various purposes: preventive surveillance to
deter criminals, and especially the calculated use of moderate force to deal
with political demonstrations and other disorder, in which the use of the army
had often proved to be worse than useless. However, when the modern police
were invented in the second quarter of the century it was certainly not envisaged that they should come to control the prosecutorial process. The police were
regarded at first by the middle and upper classes, as well as the working class,
as a potentially dangerous innovation - the creation for the first time since
the seventeenth century of an executive force that might be used to subvert
political liberty through spying, harassment, and the exercise of arbitrary
power. Their powers and their operations, especially in London, were strictly
controlled to avoid exacerbating such criticisms, and it was only the level of
crime and working-class confrontations with employers and government that
convinced Parliament to create the new police. 34 To propose entrusting all
prosecution to them was, in the early years, unthinkable. The point is to be
emphasized, because by the mid-twentieth century the police prosecuted in
eighty-eight percent of indictable cases in England: the proportions of "official" (although not "state") prosecutions compared to those brought by
35
private individuals had been wholly reversed from the eighteenth century.
33Gatrell and Hadden, "Criminal Statistics and their Interpretation," in Wrigley,
ed., Nineteenth-Century Society (Cambridge, 1972) at 387 ff. is the most convenient
summary
for this period.
34
See Philips, " 'A New Engine of Power and Authority': the Institutionalization
of Law-enforcement in England 1780-1830," in Gatrell, Parker, Lenman, eds., Crime
and the Law: the Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500 (London:
Europa, 1980) and (for some of the many other recent studies of the origin of the new
police) the references in Hay, "Crime and Justice in Eighteenth and NineteenthCentury England," in Morris and Tonry, eds., Crime and Justice: An Annual Review
of Research (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980) ch. III at 45. On police prosecutions35see infra notes 37, 38 and 41.
Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England (London: Oxford Univ. Press,
1960) at 20-21. (See also text accompanying note 65, infra.) Devlin distinguishes the latter as "unofficial" on the grounds that "to call such prosecutions 'private' would be
misleading: the great majority of prosecutions are in theory private. It is true that the
proceedings are in the name of the Queen, but then in any civil action it is the Queen
who issues the writ of summons and in whose name the attendance of the defendant is
commanded; in each case the Crown is acting at the request or upon the information of
an individual. Again, every police prosecution is in theory a private prosecution; the information is laid by the police officer in charge of the case, but in so doing he is acting
not by virtue of his office but as a private citizen interested in the maintenance of law
and order." (Id. at 16-17). Maitland commented on the ambiguities of the term when
systems were compared: "To speak of the English system as one of private prosecutions
is misleading. It is we who have public prosecutions, for any one of the public may prosecute; abroad they have state prosecutions or official prosecutions." (Supra note 27, at
141). I have nonetheless used the word privateto describe what Devlin and Maitland call
"unofficial" prosecutions because it accurately describes not only the theory but the
practice in England for much of the period under discussion, and because it reflects
Canadian usage.
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How and when that occurred is not yet clear. But most of the change probably
occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century, with some further
change even in the early twentieth century. The context in which it occurred is
important for understanding the second salient feature of the English prosecutorial system that is overlooked by contemporary Canadian courts: the
constitutional significance traditionally attached to private prosecution.
III. THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR'S ROLE PRESERVED
By the 1830s and 1840s, features of private prosecution that had satisfied
upper-class political opinion in the 1700s were instead arousing profound concern. It was a period of rapid population increase, urbanization, and momentous economic change such as England had never known. In many areas of
English life the classes represented in Parliament and the professions felt a
dismaying loss of control. The acute political conflict accompanying these
changes had particular significance for the criminal law because it was in part
class conflict, at a time of widespread destitution and revolutionary criticism
of the political and economic structure. For many propertied Englishmen, the
mounting crime rate summarized all these issues. Publication of criminal
statistics had begun in 1805, and the data indicated ever-increasing rates of
prosecutions and (so it was believed) of crime. In the same period the early
Victorian legislature was embarked on a thorough examination of all aspects
of the criminal as well as civil law, spurred on in part by the self-interest of the
lawyers, whose professional consciousness was developing rapidly in a period
of high professional unemployment.
In these circumstances the personal knowledge, local scale, and discretionary accommodations of the eighteenth-century system of private prosecution seemed far less acceptable. Lawyers and magistrates increasingly
castigated serious defects: the compounding of offences that should have been
prosecuted, the malicious prosecution of innocent individuals by personally interested or blackmailing prosecutors, the inability of grand jurors to sift the
evidence when three or four hundred cases now came before them in a week,
the blow to the legitimacy of the law when injustices were perpetrated, and the
weakening of social and political authority when serious cases were not pursued. Equally distressing, the increased granting of costs had probably admitted more poor prosecutors to the system, and they sometimes used it for their
own dubious ends. As a result, critics in Parliament, some of them Chief
Justices and Lords Chancellor, attempted in the 1830s, again in the 1850s, and
36
finally in the 1870s, to introduce a system of public prosecution in England.
Extensive evidence was gathered from the United States, Scotland, Ireland,
and France, where public prosecution was long established. Detailed bills providing for a new system under one form or another were introduced repeatedly
in the House of Commons. All of them failed to become law, and when Parliament finally created the office of Director of Public Prosecutions, in 1879, it
was hardly what the name implied. Holding a watching brief, with limited
powers, the Director of Public Prosecutions until the twentieth century had
36

An outline of the early legislative history is given in Kurland and Waters, Public
Prosecution in England, 1854-79. An Essay in English Legislative History (1959), 9
Duke L.J. 493. A more detailed account of the period from the 1870s is in Edwards,
supra note 2, especially chs. 16 and 17.
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relatively little power over the course of the vast majority of prosecutions. The
private prosecutor continued to reign supreme. It is important to see the
reasons for this.
First, however, we should note that by 1879 the private prosecutor had
begun, slowly, to turn blue. The police had become convenient substitutes for
private prosecutors who would not, or could not, go to the trouble or expense
of proceeding. As new police forces were created throughout England, they increasingly shared prosecutorial duties with private citizens, with prosecuting
associations, and with a competing group of "official" (in fact semi-official)
prosecutors, the magistrates' clerks. In a few towns chief constables, with
selected barristers, came to dominate prosecutions. It was partly in response to
these developments that some Members of Parliament sought to introduce a
professional, lawyerly public prosecutorial system. Parliament was presented
with extensive evidence by the 1850s that the police in some parts of the country, attracted by the award of costs, were responsible for a great many
malicious and vexatious prosecutions, usually initiated with the assistance of
disreputable attorneys. The mover of the abortive legislation of the 1850s gave
as one of his most important goals in seeking a public prosecutorial system the
removal of policemen from the sphere of prosecution:
The Crown, indeed, was the nominal prosecutor, but the consequence [of the lack
of a public prosecutor] was that we gave to policemen, to a class amongst whom
were to be found some of the most hardened and profligate of mankind, and over
whom the most incessant vigilance was requisite to prevent flagrant and cruel
abuses of their authority, we gave to these men [when they prosecuted] an
unlimited power of pardon and connivance; and we entrusted them with an
authority which in every country-but 37England was regulated with as much anxiety
as the functions of the Judge himself.
Sir Alexander Cockburn, Attorney-General in 1855, probably expressed the
Parliamentary consensus about the practical and constitutional implications of
police prosecutors:
I will add another, to my mind, very serious evil which I have observed very often
myself, when sitting as recorder, and that is the manner in which policemen mix
themselves up with these prosecutions. I must say that I think it is a great scandal
(to use no milder term) to see a case brought into court by one of the inferior
ministers of the law such as a policeman. I do not think it is consistent with the
proper administration of public justice, in a great country like this, that you
should have a subordinate officer, who is merely the keeper of the prisoner,
clothing himself with the functions of a public prosecutor. I think it has, also, this
further mischievous effect. I have observed often, and have had occasion to notice
it in court, how policemen become over-zealous in the conduct of prosecutions. I
can quite account for it now . . . [that I know] . . . that the promotion of
policemen38 is made to depend upon the prosecutions which they successfully
conduct.
The apparently logical solution, a system of professional prosecutors who
would wholly replace both the police and unofficial private prosecutors, never
came into being. Instead, the police came to dominate what in England remains, in theory, a system of private prosecution. And for that there are three
main explanations.
37 136 Parl.Deb., H.C. (3rd ser.), col. 1651 (1855) (John George Phillimore). For a
brief biography of Phillimore, a Liberal jurist and Q.C., see 15 D.N.B. 1071.
38 (1854-55), 12 ParliamentaryPapersat 186. (Question 2396).
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One was vested interest: solicitors who were magistrates' clerks, the other
main body of semi-official prosecutors, feared that if deprived of their right to
prosecute they would suffer a significant loss of income. By the 1850s,
solicitors were a formidably organized group. Another explanation for the
resistance to a system of public prosecutors was Parliament's concern about
the political effects and legal costs of creating more patronage positions. Finally,
there was the old eighteenth-century Whig argument, sometimes implicit,
sometimes in very clear terms, that the consequences of prosecution were too
important for the political liberties of the nation to entrust it to the executive.
In 1844 James Paul Cobbett, a London barrister, son of William Cobbett, and
a democrat in an age when few men of his class or profession were such, protested to the Criminal Law Commissioners that public prosecution would be a
most dangerous innovation.
In this country [he wrote] any man has a right to indict any other man upon any
charge. We are so accustomed to this right, and are so completely free from trammels to interfere with it, that it is no wonder if, having often to consider the
unavoidable trouble of the duty, we are not always alive to the advantages of the
right. This right, when exercised, is not without its responsibilities; another part of
the law has wisely taken care of that; but it is a most valuable right, and perhaps
next only to that of being fairly tried when we are ourselves indicted. Set up the
"public prosecutor", and then you have, at once, a power of veto against every
man's prosecution; and the great offender, with great interest, may be allowed to
escape by this new fangled authority, without even the intervention of a Grand
Jury's "ignoramus". If we absolutely prohibit the common law prosecutor, that
is, the party injured or complaining, from taking legal steps, this is the result which
will happen to a certainty•... I repeat that you have no right to deprive the subject
of his liberty, so long enjoyed, and with such good effects, by preferring a criminal
charge against others who may have at once done him and his country a wrong, to
strip him of the power of enforcing that
39 redress, and making that example which
the law requires for the good of both.
Cobbett foresaw the corrupt protection of the powerful offender, and a
danger of the kind of oppression associated with Star Chamber. The Clerk of

the Peace of Wigan was more succinct; a public prosecutor, he said:
would have the power of refusing to proceed in cases where parties thought there
ought to be a prosecution, and this power might (and particularly in cases of
political excitement) cause a denial of justice. I think that in all cases any man who
has sustained injury, ought to be at liberty to put the law in force, and not be
deprived of his remedy through the malice or caprice of a public prosecutor refusing to proceed, and therefore leaving him without remedy. If this power is entrusted to a public prosecutor, it will be a greater encroachment upon the right
40 of a
trial by jury than any encroachment there has been, and these are not a few.
By the late 1800s, the mid-century attack on police prosecution and the insistent demand for a professional state prosecution had largely disappeared.

The creation and consolidation of the limited powers of the Director of Public
Prosecutions after 1879 can be only part of the reason. Other possible influences include the gradual development of a more judicial preliminary procedure (codified in 1848) under more diligent magistrates; the increasing pro-

fessionalization of the provincial police forces so that they increasingly
resembled that of London; and perhaps the absorption of a certain amount of
39
Royal
40

Commission on CriminalLaw, Eighth Report (c. 656, 1845) at 295-96.
d. at 226.
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professional unemployment that had prompted briefless young barristers to
campaign for a prosecutorial system. A more general influence may have been
the long, largely uninterrupted secular decline in the number of prosecutions
from the 1850s to the end of the century. The fears of the early-Victorian middle class that political and social authority was dangerously threatened, and
that the criminal law was being abused, yielded to the greater confidence that
characterized the second half of the century when the policeman came to
epitomize (for much of the middle class) security and order. Exactly when and
why police prosecutions came to predominate is not yet known, but it was
probably in this period. 41 The policed society came to be perceived as the normal society and the prosecuting constable as, for many, part of the efficiently
functioning modern state, even if the law considered him as simply another
private prosecutor.
Nonetheless, few formal and no substantial curbs were put on the private
prosecutor before 1900. The 1859 Vexatious Indictments Act, 42 introduced by
the Government, reflected criticisms made by the Chief Justice in 1854, and
was apparently inspired by a few prosecutions for conspiracy launched against
respectable solicitors who had acted for less respectable clients. A very limited
43
measure touching only voluntary bills and then only for some misdemeanours,
it left the right of private prosecution otherwise unaffected. It nevertheless
aroused in some the usual constitutional anxieties: one Member of Parliament
protested that although he was concerned to guard against abuses, he doubted
that this was the proper way. "The measure was one [he said] which proposed
a fundamental change in the constitutional rights of a British subject, and
which appeared to him to be totally subversive of his liberty in those matters." 44 In 1879 the Criminal Code Commissioners recommended that the Act
be extended to control all voluntary bills 45 and in 1883 Stephen (a member of
the Commission) argued that the 1859 legislation imposed wholly inadequate
limitations on "a dangerous right":
41One study (from imperfect sources) shows that the new police were prosecuting
in only a minority of cases at quarter sessions in the Black Country in the 1830s and
1840s (Philips, supra note 14, at 101, 124-25). It appears that most associations for the
prosecution of felons abandoned their prosecutorial duties to the new police within a
period of years, especially after the compulsory establishment of forces throughout the
country after 1856 (Philips, supra note 28).
42 1859, 22 & 23 Vict., c. 17 (U.K.).
43
Perjury, subordination of perjury, conspiracy, obtaining money or other property by false pretenses, keeping a gambling house, keeping a disorderly house, and any indecent assault.
44Report of the Royal Commission on CriminalProcedure(Cmnd. 8092, 1981) at
161 para. 7.50-7.51: a private citizen would apply first to the (proposed) Crown pros.ecutor and, if blocked, would then be allowed to make application to a magistrate's
court of two justices and a clerk. The Crown prosecutor would be required to attend the
hearing, in private, to explain the decision not to prosecute. If leave were granted the
private prosecutor would be allowed to employ his own solicitor and to expect
automatic payment of reasonable costs. In its submission to the Commission (no. 161)
the Criminal Bar Association recommended (part 4, paras. 36-37) the enactment of
some equivalent to the sixth clause of the 1879 Act (supra note 36). In 1972 the government rejected an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill to limit the right: Mr. Mark
Carlisle, Minister of State at the Home Office, H.C. Standing Committee G. Proceedings 11 April 1972, cols. 1139, 1144. Similar comments were made in the Lords.
45Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences, Report (c. 2345, 1879) at 32-33; (1878-79), 20 ParliamentaryPapersat 200-201.
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It is a monstrous absurdity that an indictment may be brought against a man
secretly and without notice for taking a false oath or committing forgery but not
for perjury; for cheating but not for obtaining money by false pretences; and for
any crime involving indecency or immorality except the three . .46. [of] keeping
gambling houses, keeping disorderly houses, and indecent assaults.
Parliament's inaction in the face of such strictures suggests the strength of
the reluctance to interfere with the right of private prosecution, even in its
most extreme form, except where vexatious and malicious prosecutions were
notoriously common. Judges, too, found it useful to cite the possibility of
recourse to the voluntary bill when allowing magistrates a wide discretion in
refusing to hear an information. In 1849 it was decided that "when an information is laid before justices of the peace for an indictable misdemeanour, it is
in the discretion of the justices to hear it, or refuse to hear and leave the complaining party to originate his prosecution before a grand jury."' 47 Mr. Justice
Coleridge observed, "[tihe refusal of this rule [to compel the justices to hear
evidence] does not prevent a trial if the prosecutor chooses to go before a
grand jury. We only say that we will not oblige the justices to hear an information." 48 Those words were quoted in 1902, when the Chief Justice remarked
that in cases where a wide discretion should be preserved:
I think the magistrate, as was pointed out in Reg. v. Ingham (sup.), is entitled to
take into his consideration the fact that his decision is not final, but that a bill can
be preferred by any person, and that
49 a private person can present that bill of indictment, if he is disposed to do so.
A reluctance to interfere with the private prosecutor in the nineteenth century can also be inferred from the infrequency of the more important inroads
on his discretion, such as the various provisions requiring official consent to
prosecute, or the statutory prohibition of private prosecutors. The 1793 Lottery Act 50 is apparently the only eighteenth-century legislation. The 1829
Roman Catholic Relief Act 5 1 required that informations to recover penalties
be filed in the name of the Attorney-General, and it has been termed the first
significant inroad on the rights of private prosecutors - or at least the first to
provoke legislative comment. 52 Two statutes of 183953 and 184654 introduced a
46

Supra note 11, at vol. 1, 294.
R. v. Ingham (1849), 14 Q.B. 396, 117 E.R. 156.
48
1d. at 401 (Q.B.), 158 (E.R.).
49
R. v. Kennedy (1902), 20 Cox C.C. 230 at 237, 86 L.T. 753 at 757, 50 W.R. 633 at
636. Alverstone C.J.'s observation that in ordinary criminal prosecutions it was "not
convenient" that there should be no preliminary proceedings, is evidence of the increasing distaste for the voluntary bill, and perhaps of its decreasing use. Darling J. mentioned in passing (at 242 (Cox C.C.) ) the banal general truth: "The legislation.., is put in
the form of a criminal offence, and as it is put in the form of a criminal offence it appears to me that a private individual is entitled to prosecute for it."
501793, 33 Geo. 3, c. 62, s. 38 (U.K.). This and following examples are taken from
the list of statutes with exclusion clauses or consent provisions that is given in Dickens,
The Discretion to Prosecute (in England and Wales) (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1971) at
54-59, 69-72.
511829, 10 Geo. 4, c. 7, s. 38 (U.K.).
52
Dickens, supra note 50, at 54; Edwards, supra note 2, at 239. The Parliamentary
concern was partly that its enforcement might fall into the hands of a Catholic
Attorney-General. The Act was considered in Kennedy, supra note 49, where
Alverstone C.J. and Darling J. (at 238 (Cox C.C.) ) gave their opinion that s. 38 in no
way prevented a private prosecutor from acting under other sections.
47
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requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General to any penal actions for
sedition, or its encouragement, under legislation originally enacted without
such provisions in 1799 and 1817. Several statutes put excise prosecutions in
the hands of the Commissioners or required that they be in the name of the
Attorney-General. 55 Finally, seven other statutes concerning specific offences
gave prosecuting powers only to certain inspectors or local authorities, or required the consent of (variously) Police Chiefs or magistrates, a Secretary of
State, the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the Attorney-General. (The last
three were named respectively in three statutes likely to be used in cases with
sensitive domestic or international implications: Territorial Waters (1878),
Newspaper Libel (1881, changed to consent of a judge in chambers in 1888),
and Explosive Substances (1883) ).56 With these few exceptions (compare the
number of current ones5 7), the private individual maintained his full status as a
prosecutor in English law into the twentieth century. Moreover, in almost all
cases of indictable offences he could bypass the preliminary inquiry and take
his accusation directly to a grand jury.
The legislation in fact manifested substantial support for the general right
of the private prosecutor to proceed in most cases without any interference
from the Attorney-General (apart, of course, from the latter's ancient right to
enter a nolle prosequi. All the bills for the creation of a public system introduced to Parliament in the nineteenth century specifically protected the
right of the private prosecutor, as did the Prosecution of Offences Acts of
1879 and 1884. 58 Only in 1908 did it become possible for the Director of Public
Prosecutions to assume a private prosecution and then drop it, with no
recourse for the private prosecutor. 59 Professor Edwards argued persuasively
that this was a significant blow to a constitutionally significant right, and that
the right of the original prosecutor, if the Director withdrew a prosecution, to
apply to a judge of the High Court to have the prosecution reinstituted and
continued either by the Director or by the private prosecutor himself - part
of the 1879 Act but abolished in 1908 - should be re-enacted. He has also
expressed disquiet, as have others, with the plethora of consent provisions
3 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 12, s. 4 (U.K.) (revised as 1859, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 24 (U.K.) ).
54 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 33, s. 1 (U.K.); the preambles refer to vexatious prosecu-

tions by common informers under 1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 79 and 1817, 57 Geo. 3, c. 19
(U.K.).
55 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 53, s. 61 (U.K.); Inland Revenue RegulationAct, 1890, 53
& 54 Vict., c. 21, s. 21(1) (U.K.).
56 The Sunday ObservationProsecutionAct, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 87, s. 1 (U.K.);
MetalliferousMines Regulation Act, 1871, 35 & 36 Vict., c. 77, s. 35 (U.K.); The Public
Health Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 55, s. 253 (U.K.); The TerritorialWaters Jurisdiction
Act, 1878, 41 &42 Vict., c. 73, s. 3 (U.K.); NewspaperLibel and Regulation Act, 1881,
44 &45 Vict., c. 60, s. 3 (U.K.); The Explosive SubstancesAct, 1883, 46 &47 Vict., c. 3,
s. 7 (U.K.); Law of LibelAmendment Act, 1888, 51 &52 Vict., c. 64, s. 8 (U.K.).
57
See the list given by the Attorney-General in 1977 of those offences requiring the
consent of the Attorney-General or the DPP: 928 ParI. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.), Written
Answers, cols. 37-45. The total number was given as 96 in Home Office Evidence to the
Royal Commission on CriminalProcedure: Memorandum No. VIII. The Prosecution
Process (London: Home Office, 1978) at 11. All were under review.
58 1879, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 22 (U.K.) and 1884, 47 & 48 Vict., c. 58 (U.K.). The 1879
Act provided that none of its terms should "interfere with the right of any person to institute, undertake, or carry on any criminal proceeding" (s. 7). It also gave the injured
party the right to appeal to the High Court if the Director dropped a prosecution (s. 6).
59
Prosecution of Offences Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 3, s. 2(3) (U.K.).
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that have marked the legislation of the twentieth century. 60 The Official
Secrets Act, 1911,61 was of a piece with the few late nineteenth-century statutes
with consent provisions, but the great flood of legislation requiring the consent
of a variety of public officials for particular prosecutions began during the
Second World War. It has been variously explained as the logical outcome of
the assumptions of total war and of the welfare state, of a belief that
regulatory legislation will be most responsibly enforced by officers who are
publicly accountable, and of the rationalizing tendencies of modern government. 62 It has also been argued that consent provisions, particularly those
naming the Attorney-General, arise:
particularly in sensitive areas of public affairs in which law-enforcement would
tend to be not simply a matter of routine recourse to criminal courts, such as for

the usual property offences and assault cases, but an occasion of public and
political significance in which issues of public policy and challenge would be inclined to arise attracting widespread attention and debate and
63 permitting the accused
to appear to defend important principles and freedoms.

These conclusions, partly historical generalizations, partly normative judgments, summarize twentieth-century views quite well. However, a full explanation of why modern Parliaments have been so insensitive to the constitutional
significance of private prosecutions as it appeared to their predecessors over at
least two hundred years would take us far into the history of government and
public opinion in this century. In the light of the longer history, the widespread
assumption that a criminal trial should not be allowed (without high approval)
to be "an occasion of public and political significance" concerning "important principles and freedoms," is a strange one. It marks how far memories of
executive tyranny have receded, as well as how far the assumption that a
universal franchise ensures benign government has proceeded, in this
century. 6
IV. THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR
It might seem that the right of private prosecution is now of little constitutional significance in England. Most prosecutions, although in theory private,
are conducted by the police, their solicitors, or other official agents. Fewer
than three percent of defendants are prosecuted by private individuals (most
such prosecutions are for common assault) and about three times that number
are prosecuted for shoplifting by retail stores. Although roughly one quarter
of adult prosecutions on non-traffic offences are not brought by the police,
60

Edwards, supra note 2, at 364-65, 397-98.
611911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28 (U.K.).
62
Dickens, The Attorney-General's Consent to Prosecutions(1972), 35 Mod. L.
Rev. 347 at 345-55; Edwards, supra note 2, at 237 ff.
63Dickens, supra note 50, at 338. A more neutral formulation is given by the same
author in The ProsecutingRoles of the A ttorney-Generaland Directorof Public Prosecutions (1974), 51 Public Law 57. Cf. the reference of Miller C.J. to "self-styled
saviours" prosecuting, supra note 7.
64 Many parliamentarians and other gentlemen who defended private prosecution
in the nineteenth century were probably less inclined to trust the intentions of future
governments precisely because the franchise might become wider; see supra note II and
J.A. Colaiaco, James Fitzjames Stephen and the Crisis of Victorian Thought (London:
Macmillan, 1983) at 12-13, 23ff., 35, 49, 132, 147-56.
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more than one half of these originate with other official bodies. 65 In light of
these facts, and of the expense of prosecution and the legal bars to private initiative enacted by Parliament, there is good reason to doubt the accuracy of
judicial and other pronouncements of the importance of private prosecution.
However, such pronouncements continue to be made. The most widely quoted
in recent years are probably those of Lords Diplock and Wilberforce, in 1977,
that the right is "a useful constitutional safeguard against capricious, corrupt
or biased failure or refusal of [the prosecuting] authorities," a right that "remains a valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on the
part of authority." 66 More specific arguments have suggested that private
prosecution is less restricted than sometimes thought. In his evidence to the
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, the Director of Public Prosecutions observed that the 1908 Act explicitly preserved the right, although it
allowed the Director to take over at any time. He added:
With this in mind, I and my predecessors have always considered that taking over a
private prosecution with a view to offering no evidence would be an improper exercise of the power to intervene, save in the exceptional circumstances of a case like
Turner's. The protection against unjustified prosecution lies, in my view, with the
Courts.... If process is granted to a private prosecutor, the case should, in my
view, be allowed
to proceed subject to the normal rules of evidence and
67
procedure.
But about the very extensive consent provisions, and what constituted exceptional circumstances, he had on this occasion little to say.
There is recent evidence, however, that the private prosecutor may still
have constitutional significance in England. Accepting the argument of many
witnesses before it that private prosecuti6ns should be retained and strengthened "as an effective safeguard against improper inaction by the prosecuting
authority," the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recommended, as
65

Lidstone, Hogg and Sutcliffe, Prosecutions by Private Individuals and NonPolice Agencies, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Research Study No. 10
(London: H.M.S.O., 1980) at 15-33.
66
Gourietv. Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] A.C. 435 at 477, 498, [19771 3
All E.R. 70 at 79, 97, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 300 at 310, 329. Other frequently quoted
statements are those of Glanville Williams in The Power to Prosecute (1955), Crim.
L.R. 576 at 599; the late Viscount Dilhorne (then Attorney-General) in 604 Parl. Deb.,
H.C. (5th ser.), col. 840; Wilcox, The Decision to Prosecute (London: Butterworths,
1972) at 6; Maitland, Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: Univ. Press,
1965)67at 481; Stephen, supra note 11, at vol. I, 495-96.
Evidence no. 167, paras. 214, 209, copy deposited in the Library of the Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies. Written submissions and Oral Evidence Minutes to the
Commission are hereafter cited by number. Turner, convicted of robbery on the
evidence of his accomplice Saggs, prosecuted Saggs, to whom the DPP had given an
undertaking not to prosecute. The Director subsequently intervened and offered no
evidence. See para. 212 and Turner v. DPP(1979), 68 Cr. App. R. 70. The AttorneyGeneral, Sir Michael Havers, stated to the Commission that he did "not think it right
that any attempt to control generally the private prosecutor should be made through the
Directors' powers to take over a case and offer no evidence or my power to enter a nolle
prosequi. Both would smack of interference by the Executive in the citizen's right of
free access to the Courts; it is better that the control be by judicial process." (Oral
Evidence Minute 16, para. 32). For the power of the Director to intervene with the intention of ending a prosecution see Raymond v. H.M. Attorney-General (The Times,
Mar. 15, 1982). The relevant provision of the 1908 Act (supranote 59) now appears in
the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1979, c. 31, s. 4 (U.K.).
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part of a new system, an innovation that would allow a private
prosecutor to
68
contest the decision of a Crown prosecutor not to proceed.
Of interest, at least to those who are aware that few of our civil liberties
were established without strong, sometimes violent, popular support, is the
range of lay and legal organizations, as well as officials, who told the Royal
Commission that it was important to preserve or strengthen the rights of
private individuals to prosecute. A partial list includes Justice, the Association
of Liberal Lawyers, the Society of Conservative Lawyers, the Society of
Labour Lawyers, the Criminal Bar Association, the British Legal Association,
the Law Society, the Council of Her Majesty's Circuit Judges, the British
Society of Criminology, the Police Superintendants' Association of England
and Wales, the Police Federation of England and Wales, the Association of
County Councils, the National Council of Women of Great Britain, the National Federation of Women's Institutes, the National Union of Conservative
and Unionist Associations Women's Advisory Committee, the Lambeth Central Constituency Labour Party, the Residential Care Association, the Royal
Societies for the Protection of Birds and Animals, Friends of the Earth, the
Commons, Open Spaces69 and Footpaths Preservation Society, and the
Automobile Association.
It may be hazarded that they did not all have the same motives. Certainly
many of the last-mentioned groups were anxious to preserve or extend their
right to bring prosecutions of immediate interest to their own constituencies
(although Friends of the Earth understandably interpreted that term widely).
Likely concerns of the police were to preserve their current powers in face of a
68 Report of the Royal Commission on CriminalProcedure(Cmnd. 8092, 1981) at
161 para. 7.50-7.51: a private citizen would apply first to the (proposed) Crown prosecutor and, if blocked, would then be allowed to make application to a magistrate's
court of two justices and a clerk. The Crown prosecutor would be required to attend the
hearing, in private, to explain the decision not to prosecute. If leave were granted the
private prosecutor would be allowed to employ his own solicitor and to expect
automatic payment of reasonable costs. In its submission to the Commission (no. 161)
the Criminal Bar Association recommended (part 4, paras. 36-37) the enactment of
some equivalent to the sixth clause of the 1879 Act (supranote 58). In 1972 the government rejected an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill to limit further the right of
private prosecution: Mr. Mark Carlisle, Minister of State at the Home Office, H.C.
Standing Committee G. ProceedingsApril 11, 1972, cols. 1139, 1144.
69
Evidence nos. 174, 152, 208, 367, 161, 122, 252, 237, 148, 163, 176, 126, 159, 107,
56, 83, 139, 91, 157, 103, 115, 112. The right of private prosecutions was supported also
by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner (179), the London Criminal Courts
Solicitors' Association (194), the Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates (220), the
Senate of the Inns of Court and the Bar (Oral Evidence Minute 9) and witnesses from
the Home Office (Oral Evidence Minute 4), all explicitly on the constitutional ground,
and by the Penal Affairs Committee of the Religious Society of Friends (198), the
British Council of Churches and the Free Church Federal Council (218), the
Magistrates' Association (231), the London Magistrates' Clerks Association (233),
the Greater London Regional Council of the Labour Party (317), the Association of
Magisterial Officers (372), and the Nationwide Festival of Light (316). Evidence by individuals, including academic and practising lawyers, was also heavily in favour. All this
suggests that if Edmund Davies L.J. was right in saying in 1968, in R. v. Metropolitan
Police Cmmr., ex. p. Blackburn, [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 at 149, [1968] 1 All E.R. 763 at 777,
[1968] 2 W.L.R. 893 at 914, that private prosecution was "a process which . . . is

becoming regarded with increasing disfavour in this country," that statement is no
longer true today.
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reform that would create professional state prosecutors, and to avoid being
forced under the existing system to assume prosecutions for minor assaults or
other offences that are now only prosecuted privately. 70 A few witnesses were
interested only in furthering private prosecutions against pornographers. But
most witnesses who gave reasons for supporting the right of private prosecution argued for the general constitutional importance of an ultimate safeguard
against official inaction, whether due to corruption, inefficiency, or other
causes. Many thought it as much a part of the constitution as had James Paul
Cobbett in 1844. Those who knew most about the present state of the law
criticized consent provisions and the powers of the DPP to intervene. Only a
very small minority argued that the twentieth-century pattern of increasing
restrictions was justified and should
be carried to its logical conclusion, the
71
abolition of private prosecutions.
A constitution exists not only in law and convention but in the minds and
the actions of those who live within it. Much of the English public apparently
still values the right to prosecute, either to circumvent a negligent, corrupt, or
unwise prosecuting authority, or to bring charges when necessary against the
police or other representatives of government. Whether that right will once
again be extended will depend upon the evolution of English opinion, and its
awareness of the existing state of the law, as much as upon the recommendations of Royal Commissioners and the dicta of judges.
It seems more doubtful that Canadians will rediscover an attitude and a
right that has a much more attenuated existence in Canada. Nevertheless,
some other features of Canadian prosecutorial traditions suggest that what remains of the right of private prosecution in Canada should be cherished rather
than scorned. And here one more contrast with England is apposite.
Professor Edwards argued in The Law Officers of the Crown that one of
the most important constitutional safeguards against abuse of the pros70 Chief Constable of Cleveland (evidence no. 147); cf. the Home Office Memorandum, supra note 57, at para. 61.
71
The Legal Action Group suggested abolition in a new system of public prosecution, with a right of appeal up the hierarchy (226; in the existing system it has urged the
provision of legal aid to private prosecutors in cases of domestic violence and when local
authorities fail to enforce the Public Health Act; LAG Bulletin, January 1976, at 6).
The National Council for Civil Liberties, suggesting a full public scheme, advocated
abolition only after proof of the success of a new system, which would include a
tribunal with a strong lay element to make final binding decisions on appeals by private
individuals against official decisions not to prosecute (250). It has emphasized the importance of the right in the existing system: see Cox, Civil Liberties in Britain
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975) at 100. New limitations to prevent misuse were suggested by the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (limit to those with a direct interest, especially where a local authority has a licensing or regulating duty, as with films;
185), the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland
(limit to less important offences; 221), and the London Gay Activist Alliance (limit to
prosecutors who are victims; 363). Finally, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, Q.C. (33) argued
that the "so-called right" of private prosecution was "more in the nature of a historic
accident stemming from the very early Common Law" and open to abuse because "officious" private individuals might "at their pleasure . . . invoke criminal proceedings ... ." He therefore advocated abolition as the best course. It seems misleading,
however, to describe as an accident the survival of a right explicitly preserved by Parliament over a period of centuries, and with strong academic, professional and lay support
to the present day.
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ecutorial system in England in this century has been the insulation of the
Attorney-General from the more obvious forms of political pressure by the
convention that he cannot sit in the Cabinet, by the fact that responsibility for
the efficiency of the police lies with another minister (the Home Secretary) and
especially by the convention, established only by the fall of the first Labour
government in 1924, that an Attorney-General must be above the suspicion
that narrow political considerations have caused him either to institute or halt
a prosecution. In particular, he must never take direction from the Government in such matters. To further enhance the rule of law over the pressures of
political expediency, Edwards advocated the restoration of the right of the
private prosecutor, taken away in 1908, to ask a judge to re-institute proceedings in a private prosecution that the Attorney-General has assumed only
to drop. 72 In short, the English constitutional convention of a quasi-judicial
Attorney-General kept at a distance from his political colleagues did not appear to the closest student of the subject to offer a sufficient guarantee of untainted and responsive administration of the criminal law. It was necessary to
re-invigorate the older guarantee of the private prosecutor's power.
The contrasts with this approach that are presented by some of the Canadian cases cited at the outset of this article, and by some of the conventions of
our constitution and our political culture, are dismaying. 73 In Canada it has
been common to give both police and prosecutorial supervision to one
minister. The practice was in fact embedded in the earliest post-Confederation
legislation, in 1868, by the provision that the Minister of Justice at the federal
level should also be the Attorney-General, 74 a plan imitated in the provinces.
And in marked contrast to the English convention that the Attorney-General
should be excluded from the Cabinet to help preserve his quasi-judicial state of
mind from the immediate pressures of political colleagues, the Canadian
Attorney-General has typically been a central figure in the Government.
Often, with the advent of responsible government, he was the Prime Minister
himself. Finally, there has been a widespread assumption that private prosecutions are somehow less than legitimate parts of the common law inheritance.
These differences must have historical explanations, some of which are as
yet unclear. One explanation is that the separation of functions represented in
the respective offices of the Home Secretary, Attorney-General, and Lord
Chancellor had no equivalent in Canada from colonial times. In the eighteenth
century, and indeed throughout the period of direct colonial rule, the
Attorneys-General of the several parts of British North America were important instruments of London's rule, and the joining of both political and quasi72
Edwards, supra note 2, at 36, 37. See also Edwards, "The Integrity of Criminal
Prosecutions - Watergate Echoes Beyond the Shores of the United States," in
Glazebrook, ed., Reshaping the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of Glanville Williams
(London: Stevens, 1978) 364 at 386.
73 Here again Professor Edwards has done the pioneering work. The comments that
follow are based on information in his study for the Commission of Inquiry Concerning
Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the McDonald Commission):
Ministerial Responsibility for National Security as it Relates to the Offices of Prime
Minister, Attorney-General and Solicitor General of Canada (Hull: Min. of Supp. and
Serv. Canada, 1980) especially chapters 7, 8, and 10. The conclusions drawn are my
own.
74
Department of Justice Act, 1868, S.C. 31 Vict., c. 39, s. 1.
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judicial functions, begun at that early date, has continued to this day. When
the English came to elaborate a new constitutional convention, following the
Campbell case of 1924,75 that sought to protect the prosecutorial function
from political interference, they had a separation of functions that could be
adapted for that purpose and a conception of the Attorney-General that allowed the easy grafting on of a newly-articulated principle of non-interference. In
Canada the historical inheritance of an Attorney-General centrally connected
with (among other things) the repression of colonial demands for selfgovernment, and then charged later with control of the police forces and their
secret services, made such an engrafting of new constitutional convention far
less likely, even had events analogous to the Campbell case occurred here.
If private prosecutions have also been less prominent in our constitutional
tradition, perhaps it is because they were less important in the daily administration of the law than in England over the last two centuries. The
research remains to be done, but it appears likely that the interest of colonial
Attorneys-General in fees, and the lineal influences of New France, the Thirteen Colonies, and perhaps Scotland, had that effect. 76 Also relevant is our
political tradition, one of strong state activity in many areas, coupled with a
pervasive and deep-rooted belief, particularly among politicians, that the
governing of Canada is a difficult art precariously achieved. It may well be
that the difficulties of maintaining party unity and avoiding explosions of intergovernmental and inter-regional animosity have dulled sensitivity to the
very different question of the relationship of government to citizen. A strong
state is not an unmixed blessing.
We might, in Canada, ask ourselves about the result of our own peculiar
development. Like the English, we have not had in the twentieth century
anything resembling the eighteenth- or nineteenth-century liberty of the ordinary citizen in England to put the criminal law in action, if necessary against
the authorities themselves. Nor have we developed what perhaps in England
became a partial compensation for increasing state control of private prosecution, the principle that control should be in the hands of a minister who is better able to resist party or personal political pressures because he is responsible
neither for penal and police policy nor for the administration of the courts,
and is even excluded from the Cabinet. Whether such conventions will ever
surround the office of Attorney-General in Canada is a moot point. It is unfortunate, however, that we also have a bench, a bar, and a general public that
appear to be either unimpressed by, or wholly ignorant of, the argument that
private prosecutions, instead of being merely good opportunities for malicious
misuse of the criminal law, may sometimes be important means to safeguard
crucial rights. Even if, by making private prosecutions easier, we found "some
75In 1924, the Attorney-General authorized, then withdrew under pressure of the
Cabinet, a prosecution under the Incitement to Mutiny Act of J.R. Campbell, a Communist leader. The resulting furore led to the downfall of the Labour Government.
76In addition to Edwards, supra note 73, see the brief outline in R. v. Hauser,
[1979] 1 S.C.R. 984 at 1028-33, [1979] 5 W.W.R. 1 at 38-43, 8 C.R. (3d) 89 at 129-34.
For the wider significance of the issue in Scots law, see the account of the most
notorious recent case in Harper and McWhinnie, The Glascow Rape Case (London:
Hutchinson, 1983), and also Moody and Tombs, Prosecution in the Public Interest
(Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1982).
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obsessed . . . self-styled saviours" 77 taking cases before the courts, that might
not be a bad thing. It is worth remembering that of those litigants who brought
the most important criminal and civil cases of the last three centuries that
helped establish what civil liberties we do have, many fit that description
perfectly. A number of such cases might make it hard for governments or
Attorneys-General to assume that their judgment of the public interest is invariably the right one. In particular, it might be more difficult to stifle with a
stay of proceedings politically sensitive prosecutions, at least without arousing
public 'opinion.
Such developments would be healthy ones in our constitution. The
responsibility of the Attorney-General to Parliament for prosecutorial decisions, in Canada as in England, is not an impressive safeguard, since a quasijudicial role can easily become an excuse for the most terse of explanations. 7 8
Moreover, that the democratic franchise is the only necessary safeguard of
civil liberties, and that the Crown will always be vigilant in their protection,
are assumptions that have not been tested and that never can be. In the late
twentieth century new technologies make misdirected surveillance, misinterpreted intelligence, and covert illegality a standing temptation to governments
and to their police forces. It is an unwise person who assumes that the case for
criminal proceedings by private citizens, even against agents of the state or
against their will, is now wholly irrelevant.
77Supra note 7. Even those few commentators impressed by the potential
usefulness of the right of private prosecution in Canada have for the most part ignored
the constitutional argument. Thus Burns (PrivateProsecutionsin Canada: The Law
and a Proposalfor Change (1975), 21 McGill L.J. 269 at 288-91, 297 n. 160) recommends their contribution to the enforcement of environmental regulations, and as a safe
outlet for the ineradicable human passion for revenging a wrong. He cites Glanville
Williams'
statement of the constitutional point (supra note 66) but does not explore it.
78
E.g., the evidence of Professor Michael Zander (249) to the Royal Commission
on Criminal Procedure supra note 67, at 3: "Even the control of the House of Commons on prosecution decisions of the Attorney-General is more notional than real. MPs
can question the Attorney-General as to why he consented or refused consent for a
prosecution in a particular case - but it is unlikely that his reply will reveal any significant information." Zander supported the retention of private prosecution, the reporting of such prosecutions to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the status quo with
respect to the right of the Attorney-General to intervene.

